News Editor
By David Akoji
The recurring cycle of violence in Plateau State, particularly in and around Jos, continues to indicate that there are frailties in Nigeria’s internal security architecture. What should ordinarily be isolated security breaches have instead become a pattern that is predictable, devastating, and preventable. The latest killings are not just another tragic episode; they are a stark reminder that intelligence without action is as dangerous as no intelligence at all.
Plateau’s crisis is deeply rooted in a complex interplay of ethno-religious tensions, land disputes, settler-indigene dichotomies, and opportunistic criminality. Over the years, Jos has oscillated between uneasy calm and sudden eruptions of violence. From the crises of the early 2000s to the more recent attacks in Angwan Rukuba and surrounding communities, Plateau state has remained a flashpoint in Nigeria’s security landscape. Despite repeated assurances and interventions, the underlying triggers have not been sufficiently addressed, allowing cycles of reprisal attacks to recur and persist.
Successive governments, both at the federal and state levels, have not been entirely idle. Military deployments under various operations, increased police presence, intelligence briefings, and community engagement initiatives have all been part of the response framework thus far. The Plateau State Government has also, at different times, imposed curfews, facilitated dialogue among community leaders, and sought federal support. Yet, these efforts have largely been reactive rather than preventive, often coming after lives have already been lost.
One troubling dimension of the recent incident is the apparent failure to act decisively on credible intelligence. Plateau, by now, is not an unknown theatre. Patterns exist. Targets are often predictable. The University of Jos, for instance, has historically been vulnerable during periods of heightened tension. Its location, symbolic significance, and dense population make it a natural flashpoint whenever violence escalates in the state. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, upon receiving any credible threat indicators, security agencies would prioritize proactive deployment to such sensitive locations.
That this did not happen, or did not happen at the scale required, raises serious questions. Were intelligence signals ignored, underestimated, or poorly coordinated? Was there a breakdown between intelligence gathering and operational response? Or are we confronting a deeper institutional inertia that delays action until after tragedy strikes?
The cost of these lapses is measured in human lives, shattered communities, and a growing erosion of public trust in the state’s ability to provide security.
To break this cycle, a shift from reactive to proactive security management is imperative.
First, intelligence must not only be gathered but operationalized in real time. Nigeria’s intelligence agencies, the DSS, military intelligence units, and the police, must deepen inter-agency coordination, ensuring that threat assessments translate into visible preventive action. Intelligence fusion centers, where information is jointly analyzed and acted upon, should be strengthened, particularly in high risk states like Plateau.
Second, there must be a deliberate mapping and categorization of “high risk assets” such as universities, places of worship, markets, and transportation hubs. The University of Jos clearly falls within this category. Such locations should have standing contingency security plans that are activated automatically when threat levels rise, this includes increased patrols, rapid response units, surveillance, and controlled access points where necessary.
Third, community based intelligence should be better harnessed. It is also important to note that local populations within communities often have early warning signals that formal structures may miss. Building trust between communities and security agencies, through consistent engagement, protection of informants, and accountability, can significantly enhance early detection and prevention.
Fourth, technology must be integrated into security operations. Surveillance systems, drones for area monitoring, and data analytics can help track movement patterns and identify threats before they materialize. While resource constraints are real and can not be discountenanced, targeted deployment in recurrent hotspots like Jos would yield high impact.
Fifth, accountability mechanisms must be strengthened. When credible intelligence exists and is not acted upon, there should be consequences. This is not about blame for its own sake, but about creating a culture of responsibility within the security architecture.
Finally, the political leadership must provide clear direction and sustained oversight. Security is not only an operational issue but a governance priority. Coordination between federal and state authorities must be seamless, and security decisions should be guided by urgency, not bureaucracy.
The tragedy in Plateau is not inevitable. It is the result of gaps that can be closed, patterns that can be disrupted, and warnings that can be heeded. The people of Plateau and indeed all Nigerians, deserve a security system that does not merely respond to violence, but anticipates and prevents it.
Acting on credible intelligence is not optional; it is the difference between life and death.
David Akoji, is a PHD Student of Mass Communication at Bingham University, Nasarawa state
